The Other Road to Serfdom: Recovery by the Market and the Affect Economy in New Orleans

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In 2010, I was told that during the 2008 presidential campaign, the University of Chicago Press had a surprising run on a book by Friedrich Hayek titled *The Road to Serfdom*. A best seller when it was originally published in 1944, Hayek's book was called "a war cry" against socialist planning, endorsing the idea that private sector investments and free market solutions are more efficient and effective than government spending or planning programs. Hayek argued that centralized planning leads ultimately to impoverishment under the tyranny of authoritarian government (his example is Nazi Germany) — a type of serfdom.[1] Applauded by neoliberalist Milton Friedman and other Chicago School economists, Hayek's work has been perhaps misleadingly called an endorsement of "laissez-faire capitalism" as the best route to both democratic freedom and socioeconomic stability.[2] Hayek received a Nobel Prize in 1974 and a Presidential

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1. The alternative view, held by others at the time, was that both of these were a result of "the dying grasp of a failed capitalist system" (Hayek 2007 [1944]).

2. A companion book, *The New Road to Serfdom: A Letter of Warning to America*, written by Daniel Hannan in 2010, is called a "must read" for the Tea Party. "Hannan argues forcefully and passionately that Americans must not allow Barack Obama to take them down the road to European Union–style social democracy. He pleads with Americans not to "abandon the founding principles that have made their country a beacon of liberty for the rest of the world." www.amazon.com/New-Road-Serfdom-Warning-America/dp/0061956937/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1293125397&sr=8-1.

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Medal of Freedom from George H. W. Bush in 1991, and his work continues to be embraced by conservatives of several political parties.

The effort to "recover" New Orleans post-Katrina offers an extraordinary example of the changing landscape of neoliberalism in America and, in particular, a view of what can happen when government lets the for-profit private sector do the work that the public sector needs to do. It offers a glimpse, I would argue, of *another* road to serfdom than that proposed by Hayek. In New Orleans, market policies and practices of privatization of government services are implicated as both causes and solutions to deep suffering caused by a disaster. New Orleans offers a good example of how neoliberalism today emerges in the shadow of its ideal self as responses to disaster reveal hardened regimes of market complicity *with* big government, not necessarily against it.[3] Humanitarian relief and recovery assistance are now market affairs in which government remains, de facto, involved, but by way of markets organized for profit more than for relief. New Orleans reveals how markets have penetrated into the public sector with real implications for citizens in need. Poverty is turned into a problem of entrepreneurialism, and disasters are turned into market opportunities for profit, while government funding fuels capital accumulation in the corporate sector at the expense of many in communities like New Orleans.

Debates at the federal level over the effectiveness and legitimacy of providing federal funding to support disaster relief and other safety net programs (as opposed to leaving this job to private sector charities) are historically persistent and fraught with further debates over moral blame, Christian virtue, racial inequality, and the legitimacy of Congress vs. the courts in deciding policy and federal action (Dauber 2005). In fact, any history of the "Sympathetic State," Dauber notes, must include accounting for the role of nearly a century of federal disaster relief in paving the way for Roosevelt's New Deal, even in eras prior

3. See Klein 2008 on New Orleans, Lave et al. 2010 on science, and Greenhouse 2010 for good examples of ethnographic, on-the-ground impacts of neoliberal policies. Harvey's (2005) description of neoliberalism identifies this trend well, pointing to the contemporary unlimited expansion of the demands of capital into all spheres, from governance and public sector institutions to even more ephemeral spaces of consciousness and identity. He identifies an intensification of the role of capital in governance, ethics, and cultural logics, and this is accompanied by a reorganization of our economy, education, and juridical systems in ways that serve capital. This arrangement also points to what George Soros (2000), in critical perspective, calls the rise of "market fundamentalism"—the firm and delusional belief, taking the form of religious devotion, that the market can and will solve our problems, even when government remains involved in the distribution channels. This arrangement begins to define what is at stake at a human individual level when the public sector is penetrated, and ultimately eroded, by corporate and market interests.

to Roosevelt's term that are labeled "laissez-faire." Federal support for disaster relief, like support for those in need more generally, is not historically new, nor is it necessarily on the wane. The welfare state has not been replaced by neoliberalist crony capitalism; rather crony capitalism now makes money on the welfare state.[4] Relief assistance is funneled through the private sector in new ways and sometimes with disastrous outcomes that enable the market to penetrate far beyond government programs, even into the world of private sector charity. The market becomes the de facto measure of performance for those providing relief and for those who are trying to recover. The story of post–Hurricane Katrina New Orleans is thus in some sense exemplary of late-neoliberal experience, even if the post–Hurricane Katrina situation in New Orleans is in some sense historically and culturally unique.[5]

Understanding the privatization of public sector resources requires understanding a new set of commitments, as Margaret Somers (2008) notes—commitments to the subtle replacement of an ethics of public care with an ethics of private profit. If neoliberal policies discourage dependency on the part of the poor and needy on government "handouts" as not only failures of public policy but also failures of personhood and citizenship, then new regimes of marketized governance both reinforce and reverse this logic. They enable the needy to become a site for the production of capital while enabling the market to help grow businesses that profit on disaster. At the same time, nongovernmental and charity institutions, particularly faith-based, have been called upon to play a role in this arrangement, filling in where government-funded subcontract disaster relief has left gaps in the recovery landscape. As a result, a new set of market transactions has grown around the role of the poor and needy as both products and producers in an economy that relies on "affect" to generate new and quite large profits. Volunteers are called upon to do the work of relief while government subcontractors profit on government resources and unpaid labor, often funneled through

4. See Gunewardena and Schuller 2008 for more on disaster capitalism globally and in New Orleans. I focus here on the specific example of relief assistance for home rebuilding as well as the role of charity NGOs in this matrix.

5. Some might read post–Hurricane Katrina New Orleans as an example of a contingent assemblage that included "a terrorist-obsessed federal administration, incompetent urban and regional governance, and opportunistic NGOs" (phrasing I have stolen from a very helpful reviewer). I would suggest these are also tied to neoliberal demands that have been placed on them by (1) subcontracts with homeland security companies, (2) the undermining of regional authority by such subcontracting arrangements, and (3) the rise of NGOs to fill in the gaps created by these arrangements that made NGOs scramble for their own profits. For a positive take on the balance of private vs. public responses to Katrina, see Aiello and Stein 2010.

churches. To illustrate how these new arrangements work, I focus on the story of one family in particular and one company that took a lead role in the recovery process through the Louisiana Recovery Authority's Road Home Program.[6]

The Bradlieus

In August 2005, Henry and Gladys Bradlieu[7] lived comfortably in retirement in one of the oldest properties in the Gentilly District of New Orleans. Henry served in Vietnam and was a three-time Purple Heart recipient. He was retired from the US Postal Service, and Gladys had been a data entry clerk for an office in city hall. They owned their two-bedroom home on the corner lot in what was, in 2005, a densely packed mixed-race neighborhood — a success story of middle-class comfort, as evidenced then by public schools and parks, sidewalks and neighborhood churches, mortgages and relatively low crime rates, and where the history of racial disparity that overlaid this community seemed at least in some small part to be muted. What could not be seen by the Bradlieus, or perhaps anyone else, was the fragility of their lives — a fragility that had less to do with race than it did with the changing shape of governance in America.[8]

On August 27, 2005, the Bradlieus evacuated to Texas and watched on television as their home was swallowed up by Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent collapse of the levee system that resulted in the flooding of 80 percent of the city. The Bradlieus' home was under ten feet of water. It stayed that way for three weeks. When they finally came back to the city a few months later, Gladys recalled what

6. The material for this article is based largely on four years of data collection with 163 participants (each interviewed two to four times), beginning in late 2006. Data collection was done with help from research assistants, especially Taslim van Hattum, Diana English, and Edwina Newsom, and involved participant observation in New Orleans, including working as a volunteer by myself. All interviews were transcribed and coded by me.

7. The names of all people in this article are pseudonyms. The description of the Bradlieus is not a compilation of multiple cases, although it offers an example of the post-hurricane experience that was very typical for many.

8. Eric Klinenberg (2002) usefully describes this fragility in his study of the 1995 Chicago heat wave that killed hundreds of residents. In his "social autopsy" of the disaster, he attributes the deaths to the fact that the majority of those who died were among the most vulnerable (the elderly, the poorest), to the fact that response agencies were ill prepared to help the most vulnerable, and to preexisting social infrastructures of inequality (including cutbacks in safety net support for the poor and elderly) that made these patterns of mortality inevitable. The interesting thing about recovery in New Orleans is how so many middle-class families were plundered by the recovery process, not necessarily by the disaster of the hurricane or floods. For a discussion of how natural disasters are never "natural" and always reveal social inequalities that precede the events of crisis see also Oliver-Smith 1996.

it looked like. It was so quiet. “No birds, no trees, no color. Nothing. Just gray, everywhere gray.” Furniture was covered in layers of lifeless mud. Silverware that had been washed off kitchen counters was strewn about in layers of smelly and gooey sludge. Family photographs were blackened and moldy. Clothing, linens, books, and shoes were indistinguishable from the walls, with their wallpaper peeling away in sheets from the stained brown gray Sheetrock behind them. Worst of all, Gladys said, were the trees. Most of them had been uprooted, and the rest were covered in brown and were as lifeless as the neighborhood around them.

Like a lot of returning residents, Henry and Gladys didn’t really know where to begin. They had a check for $2,500 and a trailer from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The church folks in Texas who helped the Bradlieus sent them home with a few items of clothing and some dishware, glasses, and linens. The Bradlieus moved into their FEMA trailer, which measured around three hundred square feet and was parked lengthwise on what was once their front lawn. As African Americans who had lived through the years before the civil rights movement, they were used to pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps, or at least with just the Lord’s help. Henry said, “We’ll rebuild.”

The Army Corps of Engineers

Local newspapers had been publishing about the potential damage from a hurricane like Katrina for years. The Army Corps of Engineers had built and maintained the levees in New Orleans, but locals had been increasingly worried that signs of deterioration in the levee walls were being ignored. The elaborate system of channels, canals, and levees that wound through Greater New Orleans connecting Lake Pontchartrain, the Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico were originally designed to augment what Willian R. Freudenberg, Robert Gramling, Shirley Laska, and Kai Erikson (2009) call the “growth machine” of the region — the flow of river-sea traffic and maritime commerce (at one time rum and imports, and now shrimp and oil). But many of the waterways were no longer used and had created problems from the beginning. The canals served as a funnel that would direct storm surges right into the city. Worse, the canals had become a known menace to the fragile wetlands stretching over the 8,176-square-mile coastal zone that once served as a natural protective barrier for New Orleans (LOSCO 2005).

Because the canals prevented the inflow of freshwater from feeding the foliage and replenishing sediment, the wetlands had been losing approximately 13 square miles per year — or approximately one football field of marshland every hour (Freudenberg et al. 2009; MacGillivray Freeman Films 2007). By 2005, New

Orleans had little protection against Gulf hurricanes, which were generally halved in size when they first hit land (or what used to be long stretches of wetlands). The Army Corps of Engineers had known about the problem for decades, just as they knew the levees that were fed by these canals would not hold up against anything over a Category 2 storm surge.[9] Still, calls for repairs and strengthening went unanswered.

The Army Corps of Engineers had been undergoing its own structural adjustments for at least two decades. Private sector companies had developed relationships as legacy contractors with the Army Corps, including The Shaw Group, Bechtel, Halliburton, HNTB, Titan, Blackwater Security, and KBR Associates (Carde 2008; Klein 2008). By 2003, the firewall between the subcontracting companies and the corps was hardly visible — it had become more like a revolving door between public and private sectors, with former corps engineers working in key executive positions at these companies. Few saw or raised concerns over the conflict of interest in this situation (those few who did were often fired). This was not really laissez-faire capitalism, since the subcontractors depended on a steady stream of government legislation and no-bid contract funds to keep them busy. It was nevertheless a type of governance in and through a profit-oriented market dominated by large corporations. Over the decades prior to Katrina, the Army Corps became increasingly invested in helping subcontractors undertake waterway projects that had little to do with protecting the public (by repairing levees) but much to do with augmenting the casino, tourism, and oil industries. But by 2003, the war in Iraq drew subcontractors to realize larger profits than could be earned in New Orleans, and most Army Corps work in the area dried up. The levees went unrepaired.

With little protection from the wetlands, Greater New Orleans was hit by Hurricane Katrina as what some report was a Category 4 or 5 storm. Despite the fact that the storm passed the city itself, breaches and levee failures soon occurred in fifty different locations, with over twenty in the first twenty-four hours, and another twenty levee breeches in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal alone (NPR 2006). With over 350,000 people stranded in the city, the government declared a state of emergency, allowing the government to offer more *no-bid* contract opportunities to corporations to help with relief in post-Katrina New Orleans (Scahill 2005). Since FEMA had been merged with the Office of Home-

9. The Army Corps of Engineers has, variously, and with different levels of agreement, contested the critical accounts of the responsibility of the corps in the levee failure during Hurricane Katrina (Freudenberg et al. 2010: chapter 6).

land Security only two years prior (Roberts 2009), many of these same firms that subcontracted to the Army Corps (such as Blackwater Security) were called upon to provide disaster relief (despite their lack of experience or training in humanitarian assistance operations) (Future News Today 2009, Giroux 2006).[10] The consequences of this form of subcontracting were made palpably tragic in the case of Abdelrahman Zeitoun, described by Dave Eggers (2009).

Hope in a Dead Zone: The Waiting Begins

After six months of living in their trailer (now May 2006), the Bradlieus were still trying to sort things out. Daily life presented a series of challenges. It took weeks to find a place to get Henry's blood pressure medication. There was nothing left within a ten-square-mile radius of their home—no grocery store, no pharmacy, not even a gas station. The closest hardware store was miles and miles away. There were no streetlights or mailboxes (and there wouldn't be for another three and a half years). Every trip to the neighboring suburb had to be planned carefully around the errands required for their life of "digging out," like the stop at the library to use the computer to find phone numbers for insurance agencies, applications for relief funds, and stores for basic supplies.

The Bradlieus had no home insurance, but like many New Orleanians, even if they had had insurance, they likely would not have collected much from it unless they had *flood* insurance. This was tricky business on the part of insurance companies and the federal government, entailing a careful rescripting of the disaster and its causes. When federal officials wanted to blame the catastrophe on "nature" (exempting the Army Corps from responsibility), they invoked the hurricane as the cause of the disaster. When residents asked the government to put pressure on insurance companies to pay residents for their damages from the hurricane, it did nothing while insurance companies blamed the catastrophe on flooding from breached levees instead of on the hurricane. Without flood insurance, few residents were able to collect anything. The Bradlieus got no help there.

Another resource available was from the Small Business Administration (SBA) Loan program, but the Bradlieus were not considered eligible. These loans were federally insured and low-interest, so the banks had little to lose in this lending, but for residents like Henry and Gladys, the idea of a loan was like a slap in the face. "A loan?" their neighbor in Gentilly said with a good deal of cynicism in

10. See also Cooper and Block 2006. Klinenberg (2002: 163) shows how this was also the case during the 1995 Chicago heat wave, in which many of the deaths could be traced to "the delegation of key health and support services to paramilitary organizations that were not designed to deliver them."

her voice. “I lost everything, and I *had* insurance. I already have a mortgage that still needs to be paid. I still have to pay taxes on the home I can’t live in. Another loan? No thank you.” The Bradlieus, who were on a fixed income, didn’t qualify for such a loan anyway. Without large savings or assets that could be used to rebuild, most residents who were already in mortgage debt found that their only option was to go into further debt to rebuild. For people like the Bradlieus, there was only one remaining option. By September 2006, over a year after the hurricane, Henry and Gladys felt a creeping sense of hopelessness. Their last hope, they said, was the Road Home Program.

The Road Home Program

The Road Home Program was set up by the State of Louisiana Recovery Authority to distribute federal relief funds. Returning residents who were home owners were encouraged to apply for grants of up to $150,000 to make up for the difference between what insurance would pay and the cost of repairs to their home based on its assessed value. The program was promising. Here was the help returning residents needed. It soon became apparent, however, that getting help from Road Home would not be easy. The few who received funds within the first year received amounts that made no sense to them, and most, though not all, were woefully inadequate. The application process was itself no easy feat. Records of title, assessments, and taxes were lost in the floods. Every visit to the program offices and each new correspondence entailed re-introducing one’s case to a stream of new officers assigned to their case, as if the program had no institutional memory of any work that had already been done. Producing documents and meeting the application requirements took months and months. The Bradlieus applied for Road Home support in early 2007, and after waiting nearly a year for a response, they were turned down on grounds that they had not proved title to their home. Henry and Gladys had bought their home through a bond for deed credit sale directly from the former owner. They paid the taxes and were the owners of the home, according to Gladys, who did “all the research” on such sales at city hall. This was a common strategy used by African Americans who were denied opportunities for mortgage loans through banks. But the Road Home Program didn’t accept the Bradlieus’ claim. Gladys said, “They had never even heard of a bond for deed transaction! Can you imagine? How can they get a billion dollars to run a program trying to help people return to rebuild their homes if they don’t even know how people buy homes here?” Henry and Gladys then began the long and arduous process of trying to find out how else to prove they owned their home.

Henry and Gladys were not alone. By late 2008, three years post-hurricane, nearly two-thirds of the funds made available to the Road Home Program had not yet been disbursed (Hammer 2008a). Even for those who had received awards, the funding was insufficient to rebuild without incurring further debt. This surprised residents, since the allocations from the federal government seemed more than adequate to compensate homeowners fully for their losses.[11] Adding insult to injury, some people who received Road Home funds had to return large portions of the funds (sometimes up to half of what they received) to pay back taxes on properties they had not been able to live in for several years. For some, the Road Home funds had to be used to pay off mortgages on homes that could no longer be lived in. Assessments used by Road Home were far below what owners calculated — resulting in an abundance of arbitration cases. A citizens' action group called Citizens Road Home Action Team (CHAT) formed to protest the slow pace of the Road Home Program. A Senate hearing was held where citizens voiced their concerns.

ICF International

Residents were quick to blame the inefficiencies of the Road Home Program on "the government," using epithets like "run-around bureaucracy" and "drowning in a sea of paperwork." In fact, the Road Home Program was being run not by government but by a private sector company called ICF International.

Exemplary of market-based solutions to the problem of poverty (even disaster-induced poverty) in America, ICF International was invited to design the recovery program before it was given the contract in another no-competition subcontractor bid in 2006.[12] In record time, ICF quickly transformed its relief services into a source of market opportunism:

> In May [2006, ICF] informed the Securities and Exchange Commission of its intent to issue an IPO [initial public offering] and go public. About a month later, ICF signed on to become the official administrator of the Road Home program and interest peaked nationwide. But because it waited to go public until after the contract was complete, ICF did not have

11. Reports that the Road Home Program unfairly discriminated against African American home owners were also verified by the courts. In this case, the discrimination occurred by the calculation of lower pre-storm home values in neighborhoods that were predominantly African American than in neighborhoods that were predominantly Euro-American. See also Hammer 2008a.

12. ICF International is an extremely large corporation that subcontracts with numerous branches of the US government.

> to disclose . . . ownership and shareholder information to the state before bidding on the job, and so those connections . . . could always remain a mystery. When the company finally went public in October, roughly 4.3 million shares were issued at an offering price of $12. After ICF reported a $98 million increase in revenue for the first quarter of 2007, the same shares more than doubled to a high of $25.58. . . . About 64% of that first-quarter tally [came] directly from the Road Home contract. (Alford 2007)

ICF designed the Road Home Program in a way that would maximize economic priorities and market solutions. As the anthropologist Jane Guyer (2009) notes, neoliberal monetarism favors long-term investments (in home ownership) over short-term aid for those who have no equity (such as resources in their home)—creating a sense of the "gutting" of the "near future" for the sake of the promise of long-term gains.[13] ICF would first fund people who already owned their home or who owned investment rental properties. The large population of New Orleans renters who did not own property (roughly 54 percent), some 22 percent of whom were low-income and living in publicly subsidized housing, were not offered Road Home funds or other support of consequence that would help them return.[14]

In fact, most of the publicly subsidized low-income rental housing in New Orleans was torn down within the first two to three years after Hurricane Katrina. Developers and planners used the hurricane and floods as a rationale for the redevelopment even in public housing units that suffered no flooding whatsoever. Steel plates were put on the windows and doors within weeks after the flood. Residents who lived in these housing units were never allowed back into their homes and were relocated to FEMA trailer parks sometimes an hour's drive outside of the city, miles from transportation, schools, and services and surrounded by chain-link fences with only one entrance, which had an armed guard (Adams, van Hattum, and English 2009).

Disaster Capitalism

During year three, the Bradlieus applied a second time for Road Home funding. In the four- or five-square-block area around their home, a house or two

13. Guyer (2009) offers examples of this in relation to Christian religious prophesy, especially evangelical, that places an emphasis on the long-term future (hereafter) over the short-term future or "near future." She notes that the space of the "near future," more often than not, is filled by a series of affective strategies (for managing debt, recalling historical time and trauma, or dealing with global and local frictions).

14. For more on the closing of public housing units, see Quigley 2005, 2007.

were coming back on each street. One would be gutted, one under reconstruction. Many were torn down and left as empty lots. The Bradlieus waited.

Seeing that many residents were still in their FEMA trailers, in April 2009, FEMA notified the Bradlieus and everyone else still living in trailers that they could purchase them for $25,000. Why, they wondered, were they being offered the chance to “buy” the trailer? Why didn’t FEMA just give it to them? Where else would they live if not in this trailer that had become their only home in the aftermath of their struggle with the Road Home Program? Like many residents, Henry and Gladys didn’t realize that the government had paid its contractor companies (Bechtel and Halliburton under federal contract with FEMA) roughly $229,000 per trailer to build and transport them to New Orleans.[15]

Families like the Bradlieus were seen as capable of shouldering the responsibility for helping the government recoup some of these costs. Neoliberalism favors not the ones who receive “handouts” but those who become social entrepreneurs of their own lives—demonstrated handsomely in being able to take on new debt in order to buy their FEMA trailer. As Eric Klinenberg (2002) noted, it is worth recognizing how these arrangements that turn socioeconomic safety net policies into strategies for entrepreneurial success, where the poorest do not become needy recipients of help but are transformed into empowered consumers of public resources, actually create a type of ongoing state of disaster for the poor. When it was discovered that these trailers contained toxic levels of formaldehyde, FEMA retracted its offer to let returning residents buy them. Then, FEMA initiated an effort to have all residents out of their trailers by the end of the year. FEMA then sponsored job and housing fairs meant to help them transition from trailers to whatever life they could cobble together. By the end of the year, many of these FEMA trailer residents ended up homeless and on the street, while others sought assistance from family members residing out of state or in other regions of Louisiana (Jervis 2008).[16]

15. Bechtel and Halliburton won no-bid contracts. They were contacted to begin supplying temporary housing on the day the hurricane hit, even before damage had been assessed or the levees had broken. They ultimately won the contract to supply and install 35,000 FEMA trailers to Gulf Coast residents for a total amount of $154 million. This amount was later questioned when the Defense Contract Audit Agency found that Bechtel had been billing double amounts for both corrective and preventative maintenance on the trailers they provided, leading to a $48 million error paid for by taxpayers. In addition to double billing, the company was found to have improperly estimated costs of services provided and failed to comply with federal acquisition regulations. See Myers and Gardella 2007. For a good discussion privatizing relief see also Lipsitz 2006 and Klein 2008.

16. For a good discussion of the displacement of labor and employment in the post-Katrina years, see also Button and Oliver-Smith 2008.

In 2008, ICF executives running the Road Home Program received bonuses amounting to nearly $2 million, and then-Governor Blanco claimed they were doing "a good job," giving the company an additional $912 million even though the Senate hearing revealed its numerous problems and complaints by home owners (Hammer 2008a; Scheets 2007).[17] In 2009, ICF's three-year contract to run the Road Home Program had come to an end, at which point it was subcontracted to an ICF subsidiary for-profit firm called Hammerman and Gainer, Inc., based in Virginia. By November 2010, five years after the storm and flood, the Road Home Program reported that they had received 229,470 applications but had awarded funds to only 127,980 of them. This means that they disqualified or denied support (or that the applicants just gave up on their requests) for nearly 100,000 people who needed funds to return and rebuild (roughly 45 percent of those who applied).[18]

The citizens' group CHAT contested these companies' claims they had distributed $8.66 billion of the $10.3 billion they were originally given. In 2010, the Road Home Program/ICF was given more funds to help families elevate their homes, to comply with new city housing and rebuilding regulations. Once again, CHAT reported that home owners were being faced with new loan defaults because of the continued slow pace of Road Home aid delivery, alleging that much of the federal funding was being absorbed by the Road Home/ICF contractors themselves. They wrote:

> "Lies, promises, lies," [one homeowner named Ms. Banks] laments. " 'Oh, Ms. Banks, just get that one last piece of paperwork, you and your husband, and that's it. Y'all will be able to finish your house and move on in it.' "
>
> . . . CHAT says the contractors getting paid to administer the program are stretching out the process so they can make as much as possible.
>
> "This is intentional. This is not just not enough competency, this is the contractor earning huge amounts of money," said Melanie Ehrlich, CHAT founder. (Hale 2010)

Ehrlich called the lack of transparency in Road Home Program a "Don't ask, won't tell" policy. But ICF International and Hammerman and Gainer, Inc., had no trouble being transparent about one thing: their stock portfolios held strong.

17. See Nola.com 2007.

18. Reports of poor performance began early on in the recovery process, and by 2007, articles began to show huge numbers of people who were still waiting for their claims to be processed (Schaper 2007). See also the Road Home website: www.icfi.com/Markets/Community_Development/road-home-faqs.asp.

After ending its contract with Road Home, ICF went on to obtain other lucrative government contracts, and its stock, which was trading at $12 in 2006, was trading at around $33 per share in 2010.

Contrary to the popular belief that market-driven profits will stimulate better performance in disaster relief, the case of New Orleans suggests that efficiencies of profit are also tied to inefficiencies of performance that allow neediness to continue. Need serves the investment potential of the company (it capitalizes on the idea that money can be made on disaster). At the same time, helping people in need is negotiated through a logic that authorizes relief companies to not use up all of their capital on those who need it most on grounds that recipients should not be given anything like a "free ride" (thus only giving minimal help). This enables these companies to preserve large amounts of capital for use in company "operating costs," bottom-line profits, and large salaries and bonuses for executives. This demonstration of profitability is used by companies to show that they are successful at running the business, even when they don't successfully help all of those in need. Ongoing need becomes a means of justifying ongoing federal subsidies for the subcontracting companies, even while creating a situation of prolonged, chronic, disaster of recovery. The logic of the free market that is applied when private companies are involved in relief work sometimes in this way authorizes relief subcontractors to make more profits by not delivering aid than by actually helping communities in need. Affirming Naomi Klein's (2008) discussion of Hurricane Katrina as a good example of disaster capitalism, it is worth repeating here that the parent company for ICF and Hammerman and Gainer, Inc., was The Shaw Group, Inc., one of the subcontractors for the Army Corps of Engineers.

Consequences of Market-Driven Recovery

In 2009 on the Bradlieus' block, only a few more homes were being rebuilt. FEMA trailers still dotted the yards around them. Some trailers still had whole families living in them. Large heaps of trash from homes that had been gutted after the second year (when the Army Corps stopped picking up trash) were still visible on many blocks. People were hurting. Residents described living in a chronic and stagnant state of disaster. Depression was described as a "way of life." Katrina was "the funeral that would not end."

"It takes a good deal of endurance and strength," one neighbor of the Bradlieus said. "But after three years with so little visible recovery, it wears down and erodes that strength. . . . Life as I knew it is gone." Residents talked about being depressed and developing disorders that they attributed to the chronic stress of

Figure 1 Gentilly home in 2009. Photo by Taslim van Hattum

failed recovery. There was a threefold increase in heart attacks by the two-year mark post-hurricane.[19] One resident who was still living in her FEMA trailer in year four post-hurricane said: "I'd like to think that things are going to get better here, and I'm not sure about any of that stuff. There's a lot of uncertainty, insecurity. I feel insecure. Maybe that's how to put it. It's a very big sense of insecurity here. I don't *like* talking about my kids. . . . A lot of that is feeling insecure. You don't know what they're gonna do."

19. tulane.edu/research/discovery/story-katrina-heart-attacks.cfm (accessed April 11, 2011).

Another resident likened the experience of dealing with Road Home to that of being in a fictional story or a nightmare:

> Well, it's kind of like a hamster's wheel. You keep spinning, but you are trying to reach the end of your destination in terms of a job, a home, resources, rebuilding, but you are not getting anywhere. You are in that spinning wheel, you know, but you keep trying. You get up and you go to this place, and you go to this place. The Road Home to me is like an imaginary tale, like Alice in Wonderland. Really, that's what it is because you are still in the well, but you haven't heard anything else, you know. You are still in the well, so that's like a spinning wheel, and you can't move forward until you absolutely know that you are not getting any help from this. . . . Life keeps going on, you see, it's like it's going on, but it's not going on.

Many residents just gave up, leaving messages of lost hope spray-painted on the walls of their former homes. One Gentilly resident left the message "Broken Dreams Inside" spray-painted on its brick walls for the world to see.

When the Bradlieus resubmitted their Road Home application in 2008, they included an affidavit from the previous owner attesting to their ownership of the house, which he had sold to them some twenty years before. They included their property tax records. In the same year that ICF executives earned $2 million in bonuses, the Bradlieus were denied Road Home funding for a second time. That same day, Henry told his wife he was going to lie down for a nap because he felt so upset *and then suffered a massive stroke*, becoming what Caroline—a local community organizer who eventually helped them—called "a vegetable."

When Caroline first met the Bradlieus in late 2009, she broke down and cried. Gladys called her and said she had heard that her organization might be able to come paint her home. Caroline said, "I asked her: 'Are you back living in your home now?' 'Oh no,' Gladys said, 'we're not back in the house yet.' " Her house "was nothing but studs and floorboards. The electrical, the plumbing, the roof—everything—still needed repair and rebuilding." They had nothing. No insurance, no Road Home money, no SBA loan, and no savings. Henry was completely disabled, bedridden and unable to speak. Gladys was taking care of him full time. "You know," Caroline said, "it breaks my heart to see this. Imagine, this man who was a three-time Purple Heart recipient . . . It breaks my heart. They treated him like he was a criminal, trying to get away with fraud. Imagine that . . . a three-time Purple Heart recipient?"

Caroline reminded me that everyone who applied for Road Home funds had to first be submitted to fingerprinting and having a "mug shot" taken. They said it was to "prevent fraud." But she thought it went beyond that. People who were asking for or receiving government support were made to feel as if they were criminal for doing so. Caroline wanted nothing to do with it. "It's not right," Caroline said. "It's just not right." She then turned to the job of helping them by herself.

Recovery by Volunteers

Volunteers from the Good News Camp had come by sometime in year two and gutted the Bradlieus' home. They got rid of the refrigerator, and that helped with the growing rat population. But for the next two years, the Bradlieus would be hoping and praying, waiting for help while Gladys tended daily to Henry. Caroline met the Bradlieus after working for three years to rebuild her own neighborhood in neighboring Lakeview. She formed a Beacon of Hope satellite, organizing volunteers to do the work that the Road Home Program and insurance had not done. That year, she broke off from Beacon and, with support from her local Episcopal Diocese, began to help home owners in Gentilly through an organization she named The Homecoming Center.

After Caroline found the Bradlieus, she directed her steady stream of out-of-town volunteers to the Bradlieus' home. They replaced studs and floors, laid electrical lines, hung Sheetrock. She pulled the permits herself. She got the Episcopal Church to purchase sinks and toilets, countertops and flooring. She recovered windows from the old house and got volunteers to refinish them. She assigned volunteers, a week here, a few days there, to put on the primer and paint the home inside and out. She held a special fund-raiser through a church in Seattle for the Bradlieus' roof. After hearing the story of what had happened to the Bradlieus, one prospective donor at the event yelled out, "Screw the government! We're going to do this on our own." Revealing the sense of emancipatory freedom so heralded by market fundamentalists, this type of blaming of the government simultaneously conceals the enormous role that the private sector and the market played in the Bradlieu's plight. Still, the fact that that donor contributed $4,000 of his own money to cover the cost of the roof cannot be dismissed.

In a mimetic moment with the market-driven models that fueled the chronic pace of delayed recovery in New Orleans, Caroline kept her own account for the Bradlieus. "Eight hundred volunteers and two years later," she said, "we were able to get the Bradlieus back into their home." It was 2010, five years after Hurricane Katrina, and despite her sense of accomplishment, she figured that the time waiting, the heartache and the sense of betrayal that had caused Henry's stroke were too high a cost, no matter how good the outcome now.

Caroline held a homecoming party for the Bradlieus in July 2010. Since they still only owned the two forks and a few plates that their Texan church friends had given them back in 2005, she got a local football player from the New Orleans Saints to donate his old furniture for their new home. When I saw her in November, she told me that the yard was the only thing that remained. Gladys loved her trees. "But you know," Caroline said,

> the Lord works in strange ways. I got a call about a month ago from a mother of one of our repeat volunteers. His name was Tim. He was a great kid, only in his twenties. He was really committed, really sweet. You know, I got a call from his mother, and it was so tragic. Tim died in an accident in April. She [his mother] was still having a hard time with it, trying to figure out what to do. She was thinking of starting a foundation in his name. He always loved trees, she said. She thought a foundation called Tim's Trees—you know, to plant trees would be a way to honor his life. Anyway, we talked for a long time and she was trying to retrace his steps, you know. . . . Then she told me that there was one family he helped and he talked about them a lot. She said, "It was a woman and her husband had a stroke." Caroline knew it was the Bradlieus. "That's our project," Caroline said. "You won't believe it but we just moved them back into their home a few weeks ago. Their home is finished, and all that's left is the landscaping."

"So, do you know what she did?" Caroline said, tears in her eyes, a tremble in her voice. "We'll do it,' Tim's mom said. 'We'll come and finish the yard.' She did it. She brought her whole family and all of Tim's friends here this weekend and they planted trees and bushes and sod. It was a kind of memorial for Tim, you know." Tears welling up in my eyes as well now, I began to think that perhaps there was something more to this changing landscape of private sector caregiving than my cynical lens had captured.

In the absence of effectively delivered structural support from the government, or rather in the presence of a subcontracting process that authorized private sector for-profit companies to provide disaster recovery, residents of New Orleans had to rely on each other and on the steady stream of (largely) faith-based charity volunteers to rebuild. These sources of relief, as we will see, operate through the generation of both unpaid labor and through the generation of affect (Clough 2007). Affect here is the emotional sense of urgency tied to tragic situations and an injunction to action. Affect here commands a sense of purpose and ethical goodness from those who volunteer and a sense of restored faith in society on the part of those who receive. Faith-based institutions that work largely through the circulation of this type of affect now, more than ever, fill in the gaps left open by the failure of both the private sector insurance companies and marketized governance to help rebuild New Orleans. This is why in Caroline's eyes, recovery had nothing to do with government or the market and everything to do with faith.

The Spiritual Uplift of Disaster Capitalism

Without the volunteers, everyone will tell you, New Orleans would not have come back. With the city about 76 percent recovered by early 2011, most residents still say that faith-based volunteers made it all possible.

There is a long and complicated history of the role of federal government in disaster relief in the United States (Dauber 2005), and an equally long, if not longer, history of collaboration between government and large international charities like the Red Cross in providing disaster relief. The latter can be contextualized in an even more historical set of relationships between the Church and modern secular states in relation to institutionalizing government assistance for the poor or disenfranchised (Jones 2005). Dauber notes that calls for increased government welfare programs in the United States have historically been couched in appeals to religious (usually Christian) duty, even though contemporary political debates often reverse this. Neoliberalism since the 1970s has placed an interesting burden on federal welfare programs (transforming them into workfare programs and calling for limits on "handouts"), and one outcome of this has been an increase in shifting the burden of caring for those who remain poor or disenfranchised onto the private and faith-based sector (Somers 2008). By time of George Bush Sr.'s famous call for "a thousand points of light" to rise up and take care of those in need, people in the United States had already started to rely more fully on nongovernmental institutions and faith-based charity to survive, not just in times of crisis precipitated by disasters, but in their "normal" everyday lives which had been on and off failed by a plundered economy. These policies were accompanied by greater tolerance for government funding of organized religious groups who provide public services, from relief to education.

The churches were in post-hurricane Katrina New Orleans from the beginning. The Good News Camp, formed by the Disaster Pastor Network (a.k.a. Jerry Davis Ministries/Christian World Embassy), formed as a spontaneous gathering of volunteers who arrived from all over the country with tents, boots, masks, and gloves and camped out in City Park for the first two years after the storm, cooking in a massive open-air kitchen that fed hundreds on volunteer time, food, fuel, and devotion. By the end, this camp hosted over 17,000 volunteers and was praised by the White House, state government, and the City of New Orleans (Sparks 2009).[20] Of the top ten private charities involved in Katrina relief, seven were faith-based, including Christian World Assemblies (17,000 workers), Salvation Army ($336m in contributions), Catholic Charities USA ($142m), Habitat/Baptist Crossroads ($82m), United Methodist ($69.9m), International Aid/Christian Relief ($50.5m), and Feed the Children ($47.1m). This is in addition to numerous small grassroots organizations (many of which were also faith-based) formed by local community organizers and collectivities as well as new missionary-based Christian intentional communities that came to New Orleans to help others rebuild and in some cases to spread their faith (Sparks 2009).[21] In New Orleans, faith-based charity became one, if not the best, source of rebuilding support. But even here, over time, such aid was forced to deal with the market in much the same way that government-funded subcontracting relief efforts were.

The private sector role in disaster relief in New Orleans, and particularly the large role played by for-profit subcontractors, was exemplary of the trend toward privatization of many federally funded programs, including government safety net programs, more generally in the United States. More surprising is how the involvement of for-profit corporate entities and the government support of them has also changed the landscape for charities, including those that are faith-based. The marriage of private sector to public sector funding and services produced new incentives and methods of accounting for outcomes and effectiveness that made organizations like ICF corporation market competitors to organizations like the Good News Camp and the Red Cross. That is, even though there is a long history of NGO charity organization involvement in disaster relief in the United States (some of which has been funded through a combination of public donations and federal grants, such as the American Red Cross), there is a growing and sizable corporate for-profit subsector that now operates within the humanitarian playing field, and this subsector now plays a large role in marketizing relief efforts, as we will see.

20. Along with numerous ministry partners, Good News Camp provided some $75 million in goods and services. Disaster Pastor Network, n.d. www.ano.int.com/about_jerry.html (accessed July 20, 2010). For photos of the camp, visit www.photographersdirect.com/buyers/search.asp?search=good+news+camp+new+orleans&sz=0&maximages=40&l=on&p=on&s=on&w=on (accessed June 24, 2010).

21. See Luft 2009 on grassroots community organizing or new social movements in the aftermath of Katrina in New Orleans, and Sparks 2009 on religious groups there.

HandsOn Network

In 2010, New Orleans boasted that it was home to the largest outpouring of grassroots volunteer service work ever seen in the nation. In recognition of this, the city agreed to host a conference sponsored by HandsOn Network in 2011. HandsOn New Orleans, a subsidiary of HandsOn Network, has been called a model of a nationally based, federally funded public-private partnership that uses federal support, corporate philanthropy, and partnership with multiple local grassroots volunteer-based organizations. Many of these local organizations are faith-based. Its largest funder is the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS, an independent agency of the US government founded under the direction of Stephen Goldsmith for the administration of George Bush Sr. as a deliberate instance of privatization-oriented neoliberal reform of charity).[22] In 2007 HandsOn merged with The Points of Light Institute (the private sector foundation initiated with federal support under Bush Sr.'s administration to grow charity and the church's role in public service).

In 2010, large amounts of funding were poured into the marketing for the HandsOn conference, from a combination of corporate donations and funds from the government's CNCS as well as corporate sponsorship. HandsOn used large glossy advertising campaigns that showcased examples of the previously poor who had now parlayed their causes into sustainable charities of their own. The case stories of success provided evidence that one could resource need as a product itself in this humanitarian aid market. The work of caring for the poor had irretrievably become a strategy for turning problems into market opportunities. New networks of charity that brought public and private financing together were offered to those who could show that they could not only solve local problems but find a way to make money doing so. The first conference, held in 2010 in New York City, took up full advertising space at Times Square, with logos that reminded average Americans that they should look not to government but to themselves to solve our country's crises by volunteering, saying "It's Up To YOU!"

In September 2010 Caroline was asked to be part of the 2011 HandsOn conference as a representative local-level leader from the community where the conference was to be held. Caroline was eager to see what sort of benefit participating

22. This agency has a great degree of autonomy and operates like an NGO within the government, calling itself a "corporation." The Corporation for National and Community Service is a federal agency that engages more than 5 million Americans in service through Senior Corps, AmeriCorps, and Learn and Serve America, and leads President Obama's national call-to-service initiative, United We Serve; www.nationalservice.gov/about/overview/index.asp (accessed July 23, 2011).

in this new nongovernmental industrial complex might bring to her organization. She couldn't tell yet how it would translate into being able to help the Bradlieus or the hundreds of others who had been left behind still hoping for help—still trying to get out of their FEMA trailers or get Sheetrock on their walls. HandsOn had not offered her any real money or material support, only the chance to be part of the movement. She'd gotten a call a few months back from a woman in HandsOn who said she had sixty volunteers who wanted to come to New Orleans and could Caroline find work for them? Caroline did, but it ended up being more work for her, since she did not need more volunteers per se. What she needed was funds to pay for rebuilding materials. In the June HandsOn New Orleans conference, Caroline's Homecoming Center was showcased as a model for community-organized, volunteer, faith-based recovery. Caroline gave a speech, but what really concerned her was that like other grassroots groups, Caroline had no real way to initiate income-generation projects or to make such activities a priority, since these took time away from rebuilding efforts. Eventually, the organization sent her some AmeriCorps volunteers who were paid a below-minimum-wage stipend to live in New Orleans and help with recovery, for which Caroline was grateful.

The HandsOn Network and Points of Light Institute are advertised as private sector solutions for the ongoing problems of need in America, which are themselves, ironically in many respects, generated by the market driven private sector (or the Growth Industry), as we have seen. Efforts to recovery by way of for-profit subcontracting did not expedite but rather delayed recovery. Still, organizations like HandsOn are seen as a solution because they link government and volunteer/charity infrastructures to large corporations and the vast surpluses of wealth they have amassed. The arrangement gives the impression that it will provide a redistributive mechanism for the market to grow charity and allow the private sector to do what the government failed, or fails, to do. However, although HandsOn receives large amounts of funding from the federal government (CNCS), one of HandsOn's big marketing efforts is advocating corporate philanthropy. They offer a streamlined way of enabling corporations to "give" online. They boast mobilizing over 30,400,000 volunteer hours, which they calculate as $615 million "in human capital toward our nation's critical problems." Much of the work of recovery is thus unpaid labor. None of the volunteers who eventually worked for via HandsOn in New Orleans got paid more than a below-minimum-wage stipend, and such volunteers are often told that they should use paid time off on their first day to apply for food stamps. The accounting practices used by organizations like HandsOn are thus based on numbers that rely largely on other on-the-ground grassroots groups that came into existence before HandsOn and that use their resources and on continued support from the government.[23] Some of HandsOn's large corporate sponsors include Target, Disney, UPS, JP Morgan, and Fidelity Investments. Moreover, how this mixing of public and private investment plays out on the ground matters.

HandsOn offers a glimpse into the ways that market solutions generate large infrastructures of corporate activity that on the one hand redistribute federal aid and corporate profits to a small sector of the nonprofit world. On the other hand, these market solutions also enable corporations to profit on the world of humanitarian, and volunteer, relief work. The arrangement ideally transfers capital from private back to public, but it also enables the use of public funds for private corporate growth in ways that are largely unchecked by public sector legislation or priorities, fueling not just a free market, but a free-for-all market where profits are allowed even when services are not provided and the labor is largely unpaid.[24]

Philanthrocapitalism

Philanthrocapitalism is a phenomenon, a concept, and book title: *Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World* by Matthew Bishop and Michael Green (2008). The authors write of the phenomenon in "The Philanthrocapitalism Manifesto": "Corporations now realize that they can *do well by doing good*" (Bishop and Green 2010).

The merging of charity and business philanthropy offers new financial opportunities for the corporate sector as well as those who run aid organizations. "Philanthrocapitalism" and what is also called "venture philanthropy" hail a future in which corporations will recognize how much social capital can be parlayed into actual capital. Philanthrocapitalists hope to augment market share while conscripting even the poorest to become social entrepreneurs in a network of market-based formulations of personal success. The entailments of these arrangements, and the new sorts of accountabilities and obligations that are aroused by dependency on philanthrocapitalism, have yet to be explored thoroughly.

Already, Bryn Jones (2007) has cautioned that corporate philanthropy often involves new regimes of patronage in which exclusions of those who cannot calibrate their charitable acts to the audit needs of the market (or the sponsoring business) are left behind. Even the neediest recipients of aid must learn how to

23. www.huffingtonpost.com/social/Khrista_Richardson/americorps-cuts-would-end_b_837091_81111642.html (accessed June 23, 2011).

24. This is the phrasing of Sheila C. Bair, now former chair of the FDIC, as heard on National Public Radio on June 27, 2011.

become entrepreneurs of themselves and, in optimal form, potential clients for the corporation that donated. In his book *Small Change: Why Business Can't Save the World*, Michael Edwards (2008) notes that philanthrocapitalism requires a specific type of accounting, a rigorous commitment to the notion that investments in future market opportunities will generate profits alongside social good, even in situations of disaster where need among publics seems to defy the logic of extraction economies. Sometimes the marriage of profit with social service can work, but in most cases, it can't.

Caroline, for example, dropped her affiliation with Beacon of Hope for this reason: to sustain its funding, Beacon had streamlined its accounting practices to show larger and larger numbers of clients, even though most of the help these clients received was for a single day, a single task. It was, Beacon said, more profitable from the perspective of their philanthropic donors for them to show a larger number of clients overall—allowing fiscal profits to bleed into an accounting of people as profits and vice versa. The Bradlieus were clients who couldn't fit into this model of accounting. Caroline told Beacon that the Bradlieus needed more than one day of help—in fact, they needed eight hundred volunteers and two years of help. But this didn't work for Beacon. They needed to show a high number of clients on their performance roster, regardless of overall outcome of these cases because their donors needed bigger numbers. Like the shift from welfare to workfare, recipients were not supposed to depend on charity. Ideally, people like the Bradlieus would pull themselves up by their own bootstraps with just a small amount of help, but Caroline knew this was unrealistic.

Auditing and accounting practices that place self-sustainability and fiscal bottom lines above those calibrated to the needs of recipients ensure that some goals, and some people, will drop off the aid map. Recipients of aid and those who help them must continually recalibrate their aims and goals to funders' priorities, as funders become taskmasters of accountability. People who get aid have to figure out how to make aid work sustainable, which often means pulling resources from those who need it the most and putting it back into fundraising and building business models. In the end, Jones says, "corporate support for nonprofits has a tendency to evolve into corporate dominance over them." In most cases, organizations are forced to use accounting practices that make sense in the business world, but not necessarily in the world of humanitarian relief.

In some cases, the investment of philanthrocapitalism is explicitly justified by the notion that corporate giving can result in the production of more consumers for the donor's corporate products. Caroline Preston, the CEO of Western Union, writes in the *Chronicle of Philanthropy* that "corporate giving *should* be aligned with the business interests of the company. In other words, worthy causes are those that will provide opportunities for the needy to become customers, or that will, in the end, help the fiscal bottom line of the donor company."[25]

Using philanthrocapitalism to care for the needy, just like subcontracting to for-profit companies, can result in the production of a state of chronic disaster for those trying to recover. Life and labor are brought under conditions in which both public and private sector humanitarian relief efforts are beholden to market measures of success. Unpaid labor in the form of volunteers and needy subjects are used to generate profits at the one end of the corporate configuration, while grassroots volunteer groups are forced to scramble and compete for resources from wealthy donors by showing that they too can earn profits on the work of helping others. Despite the ostensible goal of creating downward flows of capital from the corporate sector to the needy public, this arrangement also produces a net upward flow back up to new corporations that make money on charity efforts as we will see.

Big Business of Charity

A stunning instance of how public sector subcontractors have found new profits in the work of charity is nowhere more visible than in the return of ICF International. Recognizing the growing investment in volunteer and faith-based movements as a growth sector in the global economy, ICF International decided in 2009 to reconfigure its mission. It acquired a company called Macro International, a company that promotes faith-based community initiatives through FBCOs (Faith-Based Community Organizations), which, ICF notes, have recently become the source of greater attention from policy makers at the federal, state, and local levels.[26]

25. One of the examples featured in the report is Our World, Our Family, Western Union Company's $50 million, five-year program to help migrants and their families through scholarships, job preparedness, training in personal finance and business skills, and other kinds of assistance. The program was designed to take advantage of Western Union's expertise in financial services and help those people who are the company's main customers (Preston 2010). For example, one sees in this new arrangement of venture philanthropy that the number of clients served counts more than the quality or outcome of services rendered; that promotional service work is prioritized over serving invisible (less marketable) communities of need; that donations come only as matching grants that require large amounts of time and effort on the part of the recipient; and that corporate giving comes with large strings attached. This was the problem Caroline found with Beacon of Hope.

26. The company provides research and evaluation, management consulting, marketing communications, and information services to key agencies of the federal government, including the Department of Health and Human Services (including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) and the Departments of State, Education, and Veterans Affairs, and is headquartered in

ICF's then Chairman and CEO, Sudhakar Kesayan, said of the merger,

> This transaction illustrates an important element of ICF's growth strategy—to acquire profitable, high-quality firms that provide significant growth potential and cross-sell opportunities in our key markets. . . . Macro is an excellent strategic fit for ICF, adding capabilities and clients in one of the largest of our market segments— health, human services and social programs—which is among the most important areas of the Obama Administration's focus.[27]

In their Presidential Transition mission statement of 2010, ICF International spokespersons noted that although faith-based and neighborhood partnerships are not new in America, "what is relatively new is the direction taken by federal, state and local governments over the past 15 years in creating partnerships between government and private programs to deliver public services" (Good, Orrell, and Hercik 2009). ICF makes a good business of helping those in need while reconfiguring the needy as the new workforce at the same time. According to Macro International: "These FBCOs [faith-based community organizations] are recognized as valuable partners, based primarily on their local networks and relationships, especially among cultural and linguistic minorities and other hard-to-reach populations" (ICF Macro n.d.).[28]

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the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. www.macrointernational.com/projects/faithbased/default.aspx (accessed September 25, 2010). See also www.icfi.com/Newsroom/news.asp?ID=255 (accessed September 25, 2010).

27. One of the features of the company's website profile is a great deal of information about its fiscal profitability. For 2008, Macro had unaudited revenues and EBITDA margin of approximately $150 million and 12 percent, respectively. The cash purchase price was approximately $155 million, prior to the net present value of a tax benefit of approximately $26 million. The fiscal transaction is itself interesting. See also their report on a new initiative working with the federal TANF program (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families): "The TANF-FBCOs Initiative and related TANF Faith Collaborations Initiative are multi-year projects that identify partnerships and strengthen 'promising practices' between TANF offices and faith-based and neighborhood organizations working in their communities to promote increased self-sufficiency for low-income families." The original source for this, accessed September 30, 2010, was www.icfi.com/Newsroom/news.asp?ID+254 and www.icfi.com/Newstoom/news.asp?ID=255. Since that time, the website has been edited and the full texts are no longer available. Instead one can find portions of the original news article at the ICF news website: www.icfi.com/news/2009/icf-to-acquire-macro-international-inc (accessed September 22, 2011). See also www.icfi.com/insights/projects/families-and-communities/tanf-and-faith-based-community-organization-collaboration (accessed July 23, 2011).

28. "Workforce Boards consist of public and private sector members who are providing workforce development leadership in their communities. . . . Services are designed to help Board volunteers advance the public-private model among key policy makers, *secure the role of the business sector in workforce development*, enhance members' capacity and effectiveness, and learn from

It is frightening that ICF International, given its poor performance with the Road Home Program, has now converted itself into an agency devoted to faith-based community organization partnerships nationally and internationally. The business of "staying in business" for ICF has entailed a rebranding of their mission statement but little transformation of their corporate infrastructure, their leadership, or even their profit-centered goals. If ICF's performance with the Road Home Program is any indication of the inefficiencies of profit and poor performance that are possible in this new public-private arrangement, it is worth questioning what their involvement in faith-based neighborhood volunteer projects will produce. Inserting themselves into the interface between government and citizen once again, ICF is now in position to generate large corporate fiscal rewards paid for by the government and the private sector, for what is essentially already being done at the grassroots level to make up for what they failed to do through the Road Home Program, and they are poised to conscript faith-based efforts in this process. ICF is able to poach profits from the distribution channels in a whole new way. Caroline, who has dedicated so much of her life to helping families who suffer from the managerial strategies ICF promotes, said of this new arrangement for ICF that it was "enough to make me sick."

The Affect Economy

As the wheels of corporate and charity disaster and philanthrocapitalism come crashing into the wheels of neoliberalism, the private sector, now requiring ever more targets of fiscal opportunity, finds that it needs needy people to stay in business. Of course, a capitalist market will always produce needy people. In the process, large mergers between charities, government-supported corporate subcontractors, and private sector corporations have transformed economies of need into economies of profit. For those still trying to rebuild their lives from the disaster of recovery post–Hurricane Katrina, participating in an economy structured this way has not necessarily meant that their needs are being met any faster, or more efficiently, but such participation has enabled quite a few profits to be made, and one of the mechanisms of this profit is affect.

For those residents of New Orleans who were still hoping to get back into their homes (estimates are that 100,000 were unable to return) — and as of 2010,

networking opportunities with the nationwide job training community" (emphasis added). www.nawb.org/ABOUTNAWB/tabid/53/Default.aspx (accessed October 1, 2010). See also www.macrointernational.com/projects/faithbased/default.aspx (accessed October 1, 2010).

860 families were still living in FEMA trailers (down from over 45,000 in 2007) (Brookings Institute 2010)—the process of recovery by the market has produced an emotional surfeit, an affective surplus, in which need has become a circulating resource defined by its affective registers. Affect here is not just the visceral and emotional suffering felt and worn by people like Henry Bradlieu—whose stroke followed swiftly on the heels of his huge disappointment over being denied a Road Home grant for a second time. Affect here is also a fiscal potential, with its call for emotional responsiveness and inducement to action and its ability to generate new business investments and free labor for a struggling economy.[29]

In the affect economy, companies like ICF International are able to capitalize on the disaster not once but twice (first from the Hurricane and second from their subsequent rebranding as a faith-based volunteer NGO). The hopelessness experienced by Gladys and Henry Bradlieu are the new surplus—a marketing tool and the circulating site for value in the ever growing infrastructure of the faith-based charity market.[30] But the affect generated in the people who lost so much in Hurricane Katrina becomes unmoored through a prolonged recovery process and an infrastructure of relief assistance that has enabled affect to circulate from its sites of origin and be used by the agencies hoping to poach on resources of disaster capital and even those who labor for free to help those in need.

The reproduction of need fuels the engines of charity-based aid and renders all but invisible the profit-making going on at the other end, where one can almost hear the siphoning of federal and human resources upward into the pockets of those who know how to capitalize on a good social movement when they see it, even while depriving those who need support the most. Without a governmentally organized public sector that limits profits on the part of private sector activities, these profits will remain desirable and aggressively pursued. Even charities are brought into the fold of the market in this system, as they too become subjugated recipients of corporate-controlled resources. Without accountability measures that are not governed by the market, the market will continue to serve as the primary index for success and investment, and the poor will remain no longer just the spoils

29. There are good discussions of affect as a theoretical and analytical rubric and intervention in Clough 2007 and Gregg and Siegworth 2010. These works explore the visceral-emotional repertoires for engaging in contemporary labor as well as creative thought on how structural systems are aesthetically experienced and bypassed, especially those involving the political economy. My concern is with how the experience of affect gets woven into these structures more than with how it evades, precedes, or transcends them.

30. There are interesting parallels here with the world of global humanitarian relief; see Hyndman 2000, DeWaal 2009, and James 2010.

of capital, but also the source thereof. This might be another road to serfdom, particularly in view of the volume of unpaid labor this system calls for. We are all asked to participate in this affect economy in new ways, with new demands on our time — both paid and unpaid — in the effort to take care of those who are in need, and who, despite being deserving of having their needs met — for the three Purple Hearts earned — are now made to produce profits for someone else.

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